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Abstract 
Judges’ and Potential Jurors’ Perceptions of Personality Disorders 
as a Mitigating Factor in Capital Sentencing Decisions 
Shelby Arnold 
David DeMatteo, JD, PhD 
 
When mental illness is not enough to preclude a defendant from death-eligibility, 
mental health information presented during the sentencing phase of a capital trial 
becomes incredibly important. The role of personality disorders as a mitigating 
factor is missing from the literature, despite high comorbidity rates with criminal 
behavior. The goal of this study was to examine whether personality disorders are 
treated differently than other mental illnesses that may be presented as mitigating 
evidence and if that affects sentencing recommendations. Two samples of 158 
judges and 195 mock jurors were each randomized into five conditions. Using 
vignettes, the defendant’s diagnosis (no mental illness, schizophrenia, bipolar I 
disorder, antisocial personality disorder, or borderline personality disorder) was 
manipulated. Results showed that judges and mock jurors found schizophrenia to 
be more mitigating than any other mental health diagnosis, but judges recognized 
that borderline personality disorder is also mitigating.  
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Introduction 
History of the Death Penalty in the United States 
 The death penalty has been a potential punishment in the United States 
since the 1600s, and it was generally accepted until the late 20th Century when a 
series of court cases highlighted issues with how states were implementing capital 
punishment. In 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States temporarily 
abolished the death penalty in the landmark case Furman v. Georgia, holding that 
capital punishment statutes violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Though declared unconstitutional, it is important to note that it was 
not a unanimous decision, and many Justices did not outright oppose the use of the 
death penalty, but rather the sentencing guidelines (or lack thereof) for how it 
would be imposed.  
 In the years following Furman, 35 states amended their death penalty 
statutes in attempt to make them constitutionally acceptable, and they generally 
did so in one of two ways. Approximately half of the states removed jury 
discretion by making the death penalty a mandatory sentence for certain crimes. 
Other states established guidelines to assist juries in making more informed and 
less arbitrary sentencing decisions, and encouraged jury members to consider a 
variety aggravating factors (factors that increase the severity and culpability of an 
act) and mitigating factors (factors that may help to explain a crime and can lessen 
the sentence) during sentencing.   
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 In 1976, a series of cases (Gregg v. Georgia, Jurek v. Texas, and Proffitt v. 
Florida) brought the issue of the constitutionality of capital punishment back to 
the Supreme Court. These cases stand for the proposition that capital punishment 
would be constitutional under certain defined circumstances, and they were 
important in creating the standards by which the death penalty could be 
implemented. The 1976 cases  abolished the concept of mandatory death sentences 
and required that juries consider a wide variety of aggravating and mitigating 
factors when making sentencing decisions.  
 Later cases, such as Lockett v. Ohio (1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma 
(1982), helped to further clarify the constitutionally acceptable death penalty 
statutes, specifically concerning the use of mitigating factors during sentencing 
decisions. These cases held that any mitigating evidence related to a defendant’s 
history is admissible during the sentencing phase of capital trials, and that 
sentencing juries must be permitted to consider all relevant mitigating evidence 
related to the defendant’s character and the circumstances of the offense.  
Importance of Mitigating Evidence 
 Research suggests that approximately one million individuals with serious 
mental illness are currently involved with the criminal justice system in some 
capacity, either incarceration or community supervision (Peterson, Skeem, & 
Kennealy, 2014). While there has been a large push to adapt case processing for 
individuals with mental illness, many individuals are charged with or convicted of 
violent offenses that exclude them from alternatives to standard prosecution and 
leave them subject to capital sentencing. Despite Supreme Court rulings and work 
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from activists and policymakers to stringency in determining death penalty 
eligibility and standardize its implementation, concerns remain for defendants with 
mental illness or reduced capacity that is not enough to preclude death-eligibility. 
For such defendants, mitigating evidence presented during the sentencing phase 
becomes incredibly important in sentence determinations.   
 Atkins v. Virginia (2002) was a critical Supreme Court decision that 
declared it a violation of the Eighth Amendment and thereby unconstitutional to 
execute individuals with an intellectual disability. The reasoning behind this 
decision is that an intellectual disability reduces culpability, and thus the crime 
does not merit a death sentence as a form of deterrence or retribution. As such, 
legislators and advocates have argued that using similar reasoning, those with 
serious mental illness, immaturity, and otherwise reduced capacity should undergo 
similar evaluation to determine death-eligibility (Entzeroth, 2011; Winick, 2009). 
However, states struggle with defining and categorizing those with intellectual 
disabilities (Reardon, O’Neil, & Levett, 2007) and thus there exists a large portion 
of defendants with serious mental illness or otherwise diminished capacity that do 
not fit a state’s legal definition of intellectual disability and are thereby eligible for 
the death penalty.  
 As such, mitigating evidence presented in death penalty trials can be used 
to accurately represent the degree to which a defendant’s capacity is diminished. 
The purpose of presenting mitigating evidence is to attest to a defendant’s good 
nature and character, suggest a lack of future danger, and reduce a defendant’s 
culpability (Acker & Lanier, 1994; Garvey, 1998). In culpability mitigation, there 
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are two categories of evidence: proximate and remote (Garvey, 1998). Mitigation 
based on proximate culpability focuses on the defendant’s capacity to appreciate 
behavioral consequences or an otherwise lack of control regarding the crime. This 
category of mitigating evidence encompasses any related mental illness, substance 
use, or otherwise reduced capacity. Mitigation based on remote capability focuses 
on the defendant’s character and is comprised of psychosocial factors such as 
neglect or abuse during childhood. As such, it is not surprising that a bulk of 
mitigating evidence presented in trials consists largely of psychological evidence 
(McPherson, 1995).  
Psychological Evidence as a Mitigating Factor 
 Despite the importance of mitigating evidence regarding the defendant’s 
mental health, there is little empirical research on the topic. Additionally, findings 
from the few studies that have been conducted in this area have changed 
drastically over time. For example, a study conducted by White in 1987 (notably, 
before Atkins v. Virginia) sought to examine the influence of the defendant’s 
character and the nature of the offense on capital sentencing decisions. Findings 
from this study showed that mock jurors presented with a mental illness defense 
were the most punitive compared to those presented with no defense, social history 
(or remote culpability) defense, or an anti-capital punishment defense (White, 
1987). Qualitative reviews of the mock juror participants revealed that those who 
were punitive when presented with a mental illness defense believed that mental 
illness should not be an excuse for criminal behavior (White, 1987). Conclusions 
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from this study showed that the inherent biases and preconceived notions of 
mental illness were rampant during that time.  
 More recent studies have seen a shift in findings and a decrease in the 
punitive sentencing of defendants with mental illness. A study by Barnett, 
Brodsky, and Davis (2004) revealed that the proportion of life sentences (instead 
of death sentences) was more than would be expected if no mitigating evidence 
was presented for defendants with schizophrenia who had engaged in illicit 
substance use at the time of the offense and  defendants with intellectual disability. 
Later research by Barnett, Brodsky, and Price (2007) studied the effects of 10 
different categories of mitigating evidence on sentencing decisions. Results from 
this study showed that intellectual disability was rated as primarily mitigating, 
hospitalization for mental illness, major head injury, and schizophrenia were 
interpreted as making no difference in sentencing or acting as mitigating, and 
being under the influence of alcohol or illicit substances at the time of the offense 
or having a substance use disorder was interpreted as being largely aggravating 
(Barnett et al., 2007). These findings contrast previous research which found that 
mock jurors were more punitive towards the presence of psychological mitigating 
evidence (Ellsworth et al., 1984; White, 1987). Also notable from this study is the 
way in which evidence presented with the intent to be mitigating (substance use at 
the time of the offense or a substance use disorder) actually had the opposite effect 
and resulted in more punitive sentences from mock jurors (Barnett et al., 2007).  
 Additional empirical research has focused on interviews with former 
capital jury members or case analysis from records pertaining to capital trials. One 
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study showed that jurors found proximate culpability mitigators regarding 
evidence of intellectual disability, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and 
history of mental illness to be moderately to highly mitigating (Garvey, 1998). 
Later studies built upon Garvey’s results, showing that psychological or emotional 
impairments act as mitigating factors influencing mental capacity (Bjerregaard, 
Smith, & Fogel, 2005). 
 Though useful and informative, previous research regarding mental illness 
and psychological mitigating evidence does not address the role of personality 
disorders. Though mental incapacity can have varying definitions by state, 
personality disorders are only overtly mentioned (and excluded) in four states 
(Sparr, 2009). Thus, there is room for personality disorders to be introduced as part 
of sentencing mitigation, but there is an absence of empirical research addressing 
the potential mitigating role of personality disorders in sentencing. Given what is 
known about the symptomology of some personality disorders (e.g., impulsivity, 
increase in risky behavior, decreased ability to appreciate long-term consequences) 
and the high correlation between personality disorders, specifically Cluster B 
disorders such as Antisocial Personality Disorder and Borderline Personality 
Disorder, and criminal behavior (see de Barros & de Padua Serafim, 2008; Fazel & 
Danesh, 2002; Keulen-de-Vos et al., 2011), it is important to investigate the role 
personality disorders can have in mitigation and how they are perceived in 
comparison to other serious mental illnesses. 
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Personality Disorders in the Courtroom 
 Clinicians and the law have not routinely conceptualized personality 
disorders to be a major or serious mental illness (Johnson & Elbogen, 2013). 
However, to meet criteria for a personality disorder, one has to have maladaptive 
personality traits that cause significant functional impairment or subjective 
distress, two features consistent with how society conceptualizes major mental 
illness (Skodol et al., 2005). The debate about how personality disorders fit in a 
legal context thus revolves around how we define major mental illness.  
 Previous editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) interpret major mental illness, severe mental illness, or severe 
and persistent mental illness to consist exclusively of “Axis I” disorders. Though a 
now clinically outdated term, Axis I diagnoses refer to psychotic disorders, mood 
disorders, and certain organic conditions (e.g., dementia). Previous editions of the 
DSM included personality disorders on Axis II, with the stipulation that “[t]he 
coding of Personality Disorders on Axis II should not be taken to imply that their 
pathogenesis or range of appropriate treatment is fundamentally different from that 
for disorders coded on Axis I” (2000, p. 28). Despite recent abolishment of the 
axis system in the newest edition of the DSM (DSM-5), it is possible that the long-
time multi-axial system continues to influence the way some view mental illness. 
As such, to the extent personality disorders are not defined as a major mental 
illness in the community, they will have less significance in legal contexts as well.  
 Despite some argument to the contrary (Kinscherff, 2010), there has been a 
push to exclude personality disorders, specifically Antisocial Personality Disorder, 
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from the types of mental illness that can warrant decreased culpability or criminal 
responsibility. In Foucha v. Louisiana (1990), the Supreme Court of the United 
States admitted expert testimony that Antisocial Personality Disorder was not a 
mental illness for the purpose of detention of individuals after being found not 
guilty by reason of insanity. A diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder 
generally does not support leniency or treatment recommendations at the time of 
sentencing, and in capital trials it is often presented as an aggravating factor during 
the sentencing phase (Johnson & Elbogen, 2013). Contrastingly, in State v. 
Gallaway (1993), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a defendant’s 
diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (also a Cluster B Personality 
Disorder) impacted cognitive functioning such that the mental state (purposeful 
action) for the murder could not be met. Additionally, New York allows a defense 
of extreme emotional disturbance, requiring courts to specifically take into account 
“underlying personality disorders” (Dyer & McCann, 2000, p. 490).  
 It is possible that the relatively high prevalence and over-representation of 
personality disorders in the criminal justice system have caused a decrease in the 
acceptance of such disorders as a major mental illness, and instead they are seen as 
common characteristics of offender populations (Fabian, 2003). As such, they have 
lost utility as differentiating factors within the legal system. However, with some 
push from scholars and mental health professionals to view mental illness by the 
degree to which it impacts functioning rather than more categorically (e.g., on an 
axial system or whether something qualifies as a “severe mental illness”), 
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personality disorders can possibly help to account for or explain certain criminal 
acts.  
Stigma of Personality Disorders 
 Stigma associated with personality disorders has received limited attention 
compared with the stigma of other mental illnesses (Aviram, Brodsky, & Stanley, 
2006). Individuals with personality disorders tend to experience intense emotions 
that have led laypeople as well as mental health professionals to consider these 
individuals particularly “difficult” (Hinshelwood, 1999). Further, the common 
perception that individuals have control over their own behavior and demeanor can 
perpetuate the stigmatization associated with personality disorders.  
 Research exists examining the impact of certain personality constructs in 
the courtroom. One study examined the use and impact of the labels of 
psychopathy, sociopathy, and antisocial personality disorder in capital murder 
cases (Edens & Cox, 2012). This study surveyed defense team members at a 
national mitigation conference and found that antisocial personality disorder was 
the most commonly used label in court (used in approximately 60% of cases 
reported by study participants), and that these labels likely had a “considerable” or 
“extensive” impact on sentencing outcomes (Edens & Cox, 2012). The literature 
examining the impact of such labels on mock jurors’ sentencing decisions is 
mixed. One study showed that the diagnostic label of psychopathy led to harsher 
punishments assigned by mock jurors (Edens, Colwell, Desforges, & Fernandex, 
2005). Other studies found that other factors, such as description of antisocial 
behavior or personality traits and likelihood of future violence, led to harsher 
	 10	
sentencing than diagnostic labeling (Boccaccini, Murrie, Clark, & Cornell, 2008; 
Cox, DeMatteo, & Foster, 2010).  
 Little research has been conducted on public perception of those with 
personality disorders. A small body of research has focused on mental health 
professionals’ perceptions of those with personality disorders (see Markham, 
2003; Purves & Sands, 2009), and research has shown inherent biases against such 
patients and that clinicians often rate them as dangerous, unlikeable, and difficult 
to treat. One study showed that psychiatrists view patients with personality 
disorders less favorably and tend to form pejorative judgments very quickly 
(Lewis & Appleby, 1988). In death penalty trials, mental health experts may be 
tasked with educating a jury on any psychological mitigating evidence, and any 
biases held by mental health professionals can have an effect on how the evidence 
is presented and received. As such, examining the use of personality disorders as 
mitigating evidence is important both in furthering the research on different types 
of mitigating factors, and also to gain an understanding of the public perception of 
personality disorders in a forensic context. 
 
Current Study 
 When mental illness is not enough to preclude a defendant from death-
eligibility, mental health information presented during the sentencing phase of a 
capital trial becomes incredibly important. Research has shown that the type of 
mitigating evidence presented has an effect on sentencing recommendations. 
Additionally, over time, the effect of mental health mitigating evidence has 
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changed, and some research shows that jurors are taking mental health information 
into account and interpreting it as mitigating (see Barnett et al., 2004; Barnett, 
Brodsky & Price, 2007; Gillespie, Bjerregard & Fogel, 2014).  
 The role of personality disorders as a mitigating factor is missing from the 
literature. Personality disorders have high comorbidity rates with criminal 
behavior, and thus are over-represented in forensic populations. It is important to 
conduct empirical research on how personality disorders would be perceived if 
they were to be presented during sentencing mitigation to guide legal professionals 
and mental health experts in how to use this information. Because previous 
research, such as that of Barnett et al. (2007), has shown that evidence presented 
with the intent to be mitigating has been perceived as aggravating, it is important 
to know if this would be the case with information about a defendant’s personality 
disorder.   
 As such, the current study examined the role of personality disorders as 
mitigating evidence presented during the sentencing phase of death penalty trials. 
The goal of this study was to see if personality disorders are treated differently 
than other mental illnesses that may be presented during this phase and if that 
affects sentencing recommendations.  
 This study used two samples: judges and mock jurors. Though the Supreme 
Court of the United States has held that jurors, not judges, must make the findings 
necessary for a death sentence (Ring v. Arizona, 2002), it is valuable to know if 
jurors’ opinions differ from judges’ for the states that allow judicial override in 
death penalty decisions (Alabama, Delaware, and Florida), and to know if judges 
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are operating with biases against personality disorders that may impact their 
decision-making in other types of trials or sentencing contexts.  
 To address these questions, this study provided participants with a 
hypothetical case vignette. The diagnosis and associated symptom cluster provided 
with each vignette were manipulated to investigate how each diagnosis impacts 
sentencing recommendations. Participants were asked to recommend a sentence of 
either life in prison or the death penalty and rate their confidence in their decisions, 
and to report how much the mental health information provided about the 
defendant affected their decision.  
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were evaluated:  
(1) Judges’ sentencing recommendations of life in prison versus death will be 
influenced by the mental health diagnosis of the defendant.  
a. Judges will recommend a more lenient sentence (life in prison) 
significantly more often if the defendant is diagnosed with a serious 
mental illness (Schizophrenia or Bipolar I Disorder) than if the 
defendant is not diagnosed with any mental health condition 
(control).  
b. Judges will recommend a harsher punishment (death penalty) 
significantly more often if the defendant is diagnosed with a 
personality disorder as opposed to another type of mental illness 
(Schizophrenia or Bipolar I disorder) or no mental illness (control).  
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(2) Mock jurors’ sentencing recommendations of life in prison versus death 
will be influenced by the mental health diagnosis of the defendant.  
a. Mock jurors will recommend a harsher punishment (death penalty) 
significantly more often if the defendant is diagnosed with a 
personality disorder as opposed to another type of mental illness. 
b. Mock jurors will recommend a harsher punishment (death penalty) 
more significantly more often if the defendant is diagnosed with a 
personality disorder as opposed to another type of mental illness 
(Schizophrenia or Bipolar I disorder) or no mental illness (control).  
(3) There will be significant differences between the sentencing 
recommendations of judges and mock jurors for defendants with 
personality disorder diagnoses.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Sample 1: Judges. Judges were recruited from an online resource, The 
American Bench, which contains demographic and contact information on 20,000 
judges across the US. Only criminal court judges were recruited. A power analysis 
calculated using a medium effect size (.25) and an alpha level of .05 suggested 200 
participants (40 per condition) were needed to obtain adequate statistical power 
(.80). A medium effect size (.25) was chosen as a representative value due to the 
lack of reported effect sizes in the literature. Eligible judges were current judges in 
	 14	
the United States who preside over criminal cases. Appellate court judges were 
included in the sample if they had recently presided over criminal cases. 
 Sample 2: Mock Jurors. Mock jurors were recruited via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, an online data collection resource. A power analysis calculated 
using a medium effect size (.25) and an alpha level of .05 suggested 200 
participants (40 per condition) are needed to obtain adequate statistical power 
(.80). A medium effect size (.25) was chosen as a representative value due to the 
lack of reported effect sizes in the literature. Eligible participants needed to meet 
juror eligibility requirements: United States citizen, fluent in the English language, 
at least 18 years of age, and no felony conviction. Mock jurors were also required 
to be death-qualified. See Appendix B for death eligibility questions.  
 Procedures 
  Study Procedure. All participants completed a brief demographic 
questionnaire to ensure eligibility for the study. Participants were then asked to 
read a case vignette and complete a series of questionnaires. The case vignette was 
the same for all participants except for the manipulated variable (mental health 
diagnosis). Participants then completed a questionnaire about their beliefs about 
the defendant and sentencing recommendations. The second questionnaire was a 
brief quiz assessing the participant’s comprehension of facts described in the case 
vignette. This quiz also served as a manipulation check by assessing the 
participant’s recall of the defendant’s diagnosis. Next, participants completed the 
Mitigating Circumstances Questionnaire (Barnett et al., 2004) to examine the 
impact of various mitigating circumstances on sentencing decisions. This 
	 15	
questionnaire was used to gather information about other types of mitigating 
evidence not represented in the experimental conditions of the study (e.g., abuse as 
a child, substance abuse at the time of the offense, intellectual disability). Finally, 
participants completed a brief demographic survey. Judges were not compensated 
for their participation in the study, but mock jurors were provided with $0.50 
compensation via Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
Statistical Analyses. To investigate the hypotheses, an alpha level of .05 
was used for all analyses. Although the likelihood of making a Type I error 
increases as a result of conducting multiple analyses, a Bonferroni correction 
seemed overly conservative considering the exploratory nature of the present 
study. Categorical dependent variables were assessed using Chi-square tests for 
independence, and continuous dependent variables were assessed using a series of 
one-way ANOVAs (for each sample) and independent samples t-tests. All post-
hoc analyses for ANOVAs were conducted using Tukey’s method. This method 
was chosen because of the middle ground it strikes between a liberal and 
conservative approach.    
Measures and Materials 
 Eligibility Questionnaires (Appendix B). Judges completed eligibility 
questionnaires confirming that they were current judges in the US who presided 
over criminal court cases. Mock jurors completed eligibility questionnaires 
confirming that they were U.S. citizens, fluent in English, over the age of 18, and 
had never been convicted of a felony (e.g., juror eligibility questions). Mock jurors 
also completed a death-qualification questionnaire (see Appendix B).  
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 Case Vignettes (Appendices C, D, E, F, & G). Participants read about a 
capital murder case in which a defendant broke into an office building and 
murdered two employees. Specific details about the defendant, including race and 
gender, were not provided to minimize confounds. Participants then read a brief 
paragraph about expert testimony regarding the defendant’s mental health. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, 
and no mental health diagnosis (control condition). If a mental health diagnosis 
was provided, a brief description and list of associated symptoms was also 
provided.  
 Case Surveys (Appendices H and I). After reading the case vignette, 
participants were presented with a case survey regarding their beliefs about the 
defendant and reactions to the case. Specifically, participants were asked to make 
sentencing recommendations, which included indicating whether they would 
recommend a sentence of life in prison or the death penalty. Participants were also 
asked to rate how confident they were in their sentencing decision, and how much 
the mental health information affected their sentencing recommendation, both on 
five-point Likert scales. Participants were also asked about how mitigating or 
aggravating they considered the information to be, how dangerous they perceived 
the defendant to be, and how “in control of his/her actions” they believed the 
defendant to be. 
 Case Vignette Quiz (Appendix J). After reading the case vignette and 
completing all other questionnaires, participants were asked to take a brief quiz 
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consisting of four questions related to facts presented in the vignette. The purpose 
of the quiz was to ensure that participants fully read and understood the case 
vignette. The final two questions served as manipulation checks, requiring 
participants to identify the diagnosis and at least one associated symptom. 
Participants who did not correctly answer  the questions were excluded from 
analyses.   
 Mitigating Circumstances Questionnaire. (Appendix K). This 
questionnaire was developed for previous studies by Barnett et al. (2004) on the 
effects of psychological mitigating evidence. The questionnaire provides various 
types of mitigating evidence, including information about a defendant’s difficult 
upbringing, substance use, intellectual disability, and mental disability. For each 
piece of mitigating information, participants are asked to rate if the information 
would change their sentencing recommendation from a mid-point to a harsher or 
more lenient sentence. Items are measured on a 10-point Likert scale. Participants 
are told that their original sentence is a “5,” and to adjust accordingly (e.g., below 
or above “5”) depending on the mitigating evidence.  
 Demographic Questionnaires. (Appendices L and M). Participants were 
asked to complete a demographic questionnaire at the end of the survey. There 
were separate demographic questionnaires for judges and jurors. Judges were 
asked questions about their age, gender, race, religion, political affiliation, and 
specification information about what types of cases they preside over, if they have 
any experience with capital trials, how long they have been a judge, the state they 
preside in, and if they are from an urban, suburban, or rural area. Jurors were asked 
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about their age, gender, race, religion, and political affiliation, as well as questions 
about if they have ever been a victim of a crime, if anyone close to them has a 
mental illness or personality disorder, if they have any mental health training or 
work in a mental health profession, or if they know anyone close to them who has 
been charged with murder. 
 
Results 
Participant Characteristics  
 Jury Sample. The study was advertised on Amazon Mechanical Turk and 
initially, 200 were recruited. Due to the large number of individuals who failed to 
meet death eligibility, an additional 215 were recruited. A total of 413 people 
started the survey, and 355 of those completed the survey. Of the 355 completers, 
121 people were excluded from analyses because they did not meet death 
qualification standards (i.e., indicated that they would always vote either for or 
against the death penalty regardless of facts of the case, based on moral beliefs), 
18 were excluded from analyses for completing the survey in under 4 minutes (a 
predetermined cutoff based on estimated length of time to complete the survey), 
and 21 were excluded because they failed the manipulation check questionnaire. 
The final sample consisted of 195 individuals. Of the 195 participants, 75% 
reported they were not opposed to the death penalty, 5% reported they were 
somewhat opposed to the death penalty, and 20% reported that they were opposed 
to the death penalty (but would consider it depending on the facts of the case).  
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 The mock-jury sample had a wide age range (18-75) with a mean age of 
37.2 years old (SD=12.6). The sample was closely split between males and 
females, and predominantly white. Approximately half of the sample had obtained 
a Bachelor’s degree or higher (49.2%), and all of the sample had obtained at least a 
high school diploma/GED. Of the 50 U.S. states, 40 were represented in the 
sample, with more than 10 participants coming from California, Florida, New 
York, and Pennsylvania. Almost half of the sample (48.7%) reported living in a 
suburban setting, while 22.6% reported a rural setting and 28.7% reported an urban 
setting. Notably, 10.8% of the sample reported that they have been the victim of a 
violent crime or assault, and 25.6% of the sample reported that someone close to 
them has been the victim of a violent crime or assault. Additionally, six 
participants reported that someone close to them has been charged with capital 
murder. Approximately 7.7% of the sample has worked in a mental health setting, 
and roughly half of the sample considered themselves to be knowledgeable about 
mental illness. Additional demographic information related to political affiliation, 
religion, and residence is presented in Appendix A- Table 1. 
 Judge Sample. Initially, 400 judges were recruited from The American 
Bench, to account for previous response rates in the literature. Response rates from 
this wave of recruitment totaled 7%, so the recruitment number was increased to 
reflect a total of 3500 judges, in order to account for the 7% response rate. Judges 
were randomly selected from the pool of judges in The American Bench who listed 
an email address in their contact information. Of the 3500 recruited, 251 judges 
started the survey and 166 completed the survey. Eight judges were excluded for 
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failing to answer the manipulation check questions correctly and none was 
excluded for completing the survey in under 4 minutes. This resulted in a sample 
of 158 judges.  
 The age range within the sample was 35-76 years old with a mean age of 
60.1 years (SD=7.2). The sample consisted of predominantly white males. Of the 
50 U.S. states, 32 were represented in the sample, with more than 10 participants 
coming from Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Texas and Washington. The judges 
reported having been a judge for a mean of 14.8 years (SD=7.6), and 
approximately 39% have presided over capital cases. Those who have presided 
over death penalty cases heard anywhere from 0-12 cases, with both a median and 
mode of 2. Ninety three percent of judges reported they are trial judges, with the 
remaining 7% being appellate judges. The majority (92.4%) reported they were 
knowledgeable or somewhat knowledgeable about mental illness. Additional 
information regarding judges’ demographic characteristics is presented in 
Appendix A- Table 1. 
Primary Analyses 
 Hypothesis 1 (Judges). It was hypothesized that judges’ sentencing 
recommendations of life in prison versus death would be influenced by the mental 
health diagnosis of the defendant. Ten 2x2 Chi-square analyses were run to 
encompass all possible combinations of the five conditions (e.g., schizophrenia vs. 
bipolar, schizophrenia vs. borderline personality disorder, and so on). Judges gave 
a more lenient sentence (life in prison) significantly more often for defendants 
with schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder in comparison to the 
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control condition, c2 (2, N = 68) = 8.60, p=.004, F=.35 (medium), and c2 (2, N = 
61) =11.15, p=.001, F=.43, respectively. No significant differences in sentencing 
were found in the other combinations of conditions. Full results are presented in 
Appendix A- Table 2. 
This hypothesis was also evaluated by conducting a one-way ANOVA 
(including the five conditions) and the continuous dependent variable of how 
confident judges are in their sentencing decision (on a Likert scale of 1-5; 5 being 
“extremely confident”). All assumptions for ANOVA were met. No significant 
differences in confidence level were noted among the groups.  
 Hypothesis 2 (Mock Jury). It was hypothesized that mock jurors’ 
sentencing recommendations of life in prison versus death would be influenced by 
the mental health diagnosis of the defendant. Ten 2x2 Chi-square analyses (the 
same as those run for the judge sample) were run to encompass all possible 
combinations of the five conditions. Mock jurors gave a more lenient sentence (life 
in prison) significantly more often for defendants diagnosed with schizophrenia 
than those diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder or the control condition, 
c2 (2, N = 82) = 5.15, p=.03, F=.25 (small to medium), and c2 (2, N = 78) = 12.74, 
p<.001, F=.40 (medium). No significant differences in sentencing were found in 
the other combinations of conditions. Full results are presented in Appendix A- 
Table 3. 
This hypothesis was also evaluated by conducting a one-way ANOVA 
(including the five conditions) and the continuous dependent variable of how 
confident mock jurors are in their sentencing decision (on a Likert scale of 1-5; 5 
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being “extremely confident”). All assumptions for ANOVA were met. Significant 
differences were found among the groups, F(4, 190) = 2.74, p = .03, hp2 = .05 
(small). Post hoc analyses revealed that participants were significantly less 
confident in their sentencing decisions for defendants diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder than defendants with no mental health diagnosis (p = .02). No other post-
hoc pairwise comparisons were significant. 
 Hypothesis 3 (Judge-Jury Comparison). It was hypothesized that there 
would be significant differences between judges’ and mock jury members’ 
sentencing decisions for defendants with personality disorders (borderline 
personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder). Significant differences 
between judges and mock jurors’ sentencing decisions were only seen in the 
borderline personality disorder condition; judges gave significantly fewer death 
sentences than mock jurors, c2 (2, N = 68) = 7.78, p=.01, F=.33 (medium). No 
significant differences in the confidence ratings of sentences were noted for the 
antisocial personality disorder condition.  
Secondary Analyses 
 Judge Sample. Several one-way ANOVAs were run among the four 
mental health conditions to better understand judges’ sentencing decisions. 
Questions related to the impact or perception of the defendant based on mental 
health diagnosis were not seen by participants in the control (no mental health 
diagnosis) condition. No significant differences were found between conditions for 
how much the mental health information about the defendant influenced judges’ 
sentencing decisions, F(3, 122) = 1.01, p = .35, hp2 = .26 (large), observed power = 
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.29. Participants who were in one of the four mental health diagnosis conditions 
were also asked how mitigating or aggravating they found the mental health 
diagnosis to be. Significant differences between the conditions were found, F(3, 
122) = 6.5, p < .01, hp2 = .13 (medium to large). Post-hoc analyses revealed 
differences between antisocial personality disorder and all other mental health 
conditions. Judges found antisocial personality disorder to be significantly less 
mitigating than schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and borderline personality 
disorder.  
 One-way ANOVAs were also conducted to examine differences in judges’ 
perceptions of the defendant between all five conditions. No significant differences 
were found in judges’ perceptions of dangerousness based on the mental health 
diagnosis of the defendant. Significant differences were found in judges’ 
perceptions of how “in control” the defendant was of his actions, F(4, 153) = 6.50, 
p < .01 hp2 = .14 (large). Post hoc analyses revealed that judges found the 
defendant diagnosed with schizophrenia to be less in control of his actions than the 
defendant diagnosed with borderline personality disorder or in the control 
condition.  
 Mock Jury Sample. One-way ANOVAs were also conducted to better 
understand mock jurors’ sentencing decisions. Similarly, these questions were not 
seen by participants in the control condition. Significant differences were found 
between conditions for how much the mental health information about the 
defendant influenced mock jurors’ sentencing decisions, F(3,155) = 5.77, p < .01, 
hp2 = .10 (medium). Post-hoc analyses revealed significant differences between 
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schizophrenia and the other three mental health conditions (bipolar disorder, 
antisocial personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder). Participants 
who were in one of the four mental health diagnosis conditions were also asked 
how mitigating or aggravating they found the mental health diagnosis to be. 
Significant differences between the conditions were found, F(3, 155) = 5.77, p < 
.01, hp2 = .10 (medium). Post-hoc analyses revealed that mock jurors found 
schizophrenia to be significantly more mitigating than bipolar disorder, antisocial 
personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder.  
 One-way ANOVAs were also conducted to examine differences in mock 
jurors’ perceptions of the defendant between all five conditions. No significant 
differences were found between conditions in mock jurors’ perceptions of 
dangerousness of the defendant, F(4, 190) = 1.33, p = .26, hp2 = .03 (small), 
observed power = .41. Significant differences between conditions were found for 
how “in control” of his actions mock jurors perceived the defendant to be, 
F(4,190) = 15.28, p < .01, hp2 = .24 (large). Post-hoc analyses reveal significant 
differences between all of the mental health conditions (schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder) and 
the control condition, in which participants perceived defendants diagnosed with 
any mental health disorder to be significantly less in control of his actions than the 
defendant in the control condition.  
 Combined Judge-Jury Sample. A series of independent-samples t-tests 
was run by condition to determine any differences in judge and mock jury 
members decision making. No significant differences were found in any of the 
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conditions for how much the mental health information about the defendant 
influenced sentencing decisions. Similarly, no significant differences were noted in 
how mitigating or aggravating judges found the mental health information to be in 
comparison to mock jurors. There were also no significant differences noted 
between samples in perceptions of dangerousness about the defendant. Differences 
in perceptions of how “in control” the defendant was of his actions were noted. 
Judges found the defendant diagnosed with borderline personality disorder to be 
significantly more in control of his actions than mock jury participants, t(66) = -
2.02, p = .047, d = .50 (medium). Judges also found the defendant in the control 
condition (no mental illness) to be significantly less in control of his actions than 
mock jury members t(66) = 3.19, p < .01 d = .75 large). 
 Independent-samples t-tests were also run to examine differences between 
judges’ and mock jurors’ opinions on other types of mitigating evidence (using the 
Mitigating Circumstances Questionnaire). Significant differences were found 
between judges and mock jurors sentencing decisions with several different types 
of mitigating evidence, spanning psychological evidence, evidence related to 
substance use, and other demographic factors. For all evidence presented in which 
judges and jurors significantly differed, judges found the evidence presented to be 
more mitigating. See Appendix A- Table 4 for full results. 
 
Discussion 
 The goal of this study was to examine whether personality disorders are 
treated differently than other mental illnesses that may be presented as mitigating 
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evidence and if that affects sentencing recommendations. Results from this study 
revealed that judges found diagnoses of schizophrenia and borderline personality 
disorder to be more mitigating (i.e., assigned a more lenient sentence) than no 
mental health diagnosis. Interestingly, judges did not find bipolar disorder or 
antisocial personality disorder to be worthy of a more lenient sentence in 
comparison with the control condition (i.e., no mental health diagnosis). Although 
this may be expected for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, given its 
overrepresentation in the justice system and overlap with criminal behavior, this 
was a curious finding for bipolar disorder. Judges did not significantly differ in 
their ratings of confidence in sentencing by condition. When judges were asked 
directly about how mitigating they found the mental health diagnosis of the 
defendant to be, they found antisocial personality disorder to be significantly less 
mitigating than all other conditions.   
 Judges were also asked questions related to their perceptions of the 
defendant. Judges found the defendant diagnosed with borderline personality 
disorder to be significantly less dangerous than the defendant with no mental 
health condition, however this distinction was not made between other mental 
health diagnoses and the control condition. Judges found the defendant diagnosed 
with schizophrenia to be significantly less in control of his actions than defendants 
with borderline personality disorder or no mental health diagnosis.  
 These results have interesting implications about how judges view mental 
health evidence. It appears that overall, judges recognized that schizophrenia is a 
serious and debilitating mental health condition that merits leniency in sentencing 
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and impacts how in control one is over his/her behavior. Judges also seem to show 
some leniency towards borderline personality disorder, though they do not believe 
it affects control over one’s actions. Interestingly, judges seem to draw a 
distinction between borderline personality disorder and antisocial personality 
disorder. Judges did not recognize bipolar disorder as a diagnosis worthy of more 
lenient sentencing or resulting in any impairment in the ability to control one’s 
actions, despite some possible overlap in the symptom pattern between bipolar 
disorder and schizophrenia, and its inclusion in how many conceptualize “severe 
mental illness.”  
 In contrast to judges, mock juror participants only showed leniency 
towards defendants diagnosed with schizophrenia. Mock jurors gave significantly 
more life sentences to defendants with schizophrenia compared to defendants with 
antisocial personality disorder or defendants with no mental health diagnosis. 
Unlike judges, mock jurors were significantly less confident about their sentencing 
decisions for defendants with bipolar disorder compared to those in the control 
condition. Mock jurors also endorsed that the mental health disorder of the 
defendant significantly impacted their sentencing decision for defendants 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, but this was not the case with all other mental 
health conditions. Results showed that mock jurors found schizophrenia to be 
significantly more mitigating than all other mental health conditions.  
 Regarding perceptions of the defendant, mock jurors did not show 
significant differences in how dangerous they perceived the defendant to be, 
regardless of mental health diagnosis. Interestingly, mock jurors found defendants 
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with no mental health diagnosis to be significantly more in control of his/her 
actions compared to all other mental health diagnoses. This is notable, as it reflects 
a judgment of some amount of functional impairment simply by having a mental 
health diagnosis, however lacks distinction between diagnoses.  
 Results from the mock jury sample reflect what is likely a broader 
conception of mental illness in society. Mock jurors seem to understand the impact 
and impairment associated with schizophrenia, and assign it some amount of 
leniency in criminal justice contexts, but did not extend that view to other mental 
health issues. Mock jurors did not seem to know how to view bipolar disorder, as 
shown by the relative lack of confidence in whether a bipolar diagnosis merits a 
lesser sentence. Mock jury members did not find any link between a specific 
mental health diagnosis and dangerousness, but did believe that all of the mental 
health diagnoses, regardless of which, impact one’s ability to control his/her 
actions.   
 When comparing judges’ and mock jurors’ sentencing decisions to each 
other, significant differences in sentencing decisions were only seen in the 
borderline personality disorder condition. This is not surprising given the overall 
trends seen in this study, in which judges found borderline personality disorder to 
be more mitigating than jurors. In comparisons to answers from the Mitigating 
Circumstances Questionnaire regarding other types of psychological evidence, 
judges were overall more receptive than jurors to each piece of mitigating 
evidence. Judges also assigned more lenient sentences overall that mock jurors did 
on the measure.  
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 Overall, this study reflects judges’ and mock jurors’ tendency to focus on 
schizophrenia as more mitigating than any other mental health diagnosis, while 
judges also recognize that borderline personality disorder is mitigating. This 
discrepancy is a curious finding, given the previous literature about the stigma of 
borderline personality disorder, particularly for those with exposure to individuals 
diagnosed with it. It would be expected that individuals working within the 
criminal justice system, where Cluster B personality disorders tend to be 
overrepresented, may be susceptible to more stigma than in the general population. 
Results from this study suggest that such stigma has not had an impact on legal 
decision-makers, or that more frequent exposure to borderline personality disorder 
has provided a fuller understanding of its functional impairment, thereby reducing 
stigma. It is also possible that mock jurors do not know much about borderline 
personality disorder and therefore do not find it to be particularly mitigating, but 
instead note that it is a psychological disorder so it decreases one’s ability to 
control his/her actions the same as any other disorder would. Judges seem to have 
more knowledge about borderline personality disorder, enough to be able to 
discern it from antisocial personality disorder.  
 Results from this study are also interesting in light of the previous research 
on diagnostic labeling effects. Existing literature is mixed in terms of the impact of 
diagnostic labels on sentencing decisions for antisocial personality disorder, and 
this study can contribute to a growing body of work that may evaluate whether a 
symptom pattern with a label included biases legal decisions. 
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Implications 
 This research has important implications for the criminal justice system. 
First, this research sheds light on the amount of knowledge that judges and mock 
jurors may have about mental health disorders commonly seen in the criminal 
justice system. Although both groups seem to understand schizophrenia and its 
impact on an individual, both groups lack this understanding of bipolar disorder. 
Given that bipolar disorder can be accompanied by significant functional 
impairment, as well as many overlapping symptoms with schizophrenia, it is 
important that legal decision-makers understand this diagnosis to properly consider 
it in sentencing.  
 This research also highlights a discrepancy in judges’ and mock jurors’ 
knowledge of personality disorders. Although this is not surprising, personality 
disorders are common in the criminal justice system and thus it is imperative that 
decision-makers are aware and educated of the impact of personality disorders on 
an individual. Judges’ sentencing decisions and perceptions of defendants reflected 
the view that antisocial personality disorder is not mitigating, but borderline 
personality disorder may be. However, mock jurors’ views did not align with 
judges.  
 In a practical sense, this study highlights the critical importance of jury 
education. When mental health information is being introduced during a trial, 
especially in high-stakes capital trials, it is necessary that mental health experts 
and jury instructions provide adequate education to jury members regarding the 
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information presented. Additionally, these findings highlight discrepancies that 
could be meaningful in states that allow judicial override in sentencing decisions.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although the results of this study are promising, there are also limitations 
that should be addressed by future research. First, only 39% of judges have 
presided over a capital case, potentially impacting the external validity of their 
sentencing decisions. Future research should attempt to limit the sample to judges 
with experience presiding over capital cases. There may be some sampling bias in 
the judges who selected to participate, for example, judges who are more 
interested in research or mitigation. Second, though the mock juror sample was a 
randomly selected sample from the community, it was a predominantly white 
sample and thus lacked the diversity that some jury panels, especially in more 
urban and diverse areas, may have. Future research may seek to replicate study 
findings by conducting similar studies in courtrooms using an actual selection of 
jury members from a diverse community. Finally, this study may be limited by 
possible differences in demographic characteristics across conditions. These 
demographics were not controlled for in the present study because it would be 
statistically infeasible, and to increase ecological validity of the study, given the 
diverse demographic characteristics of jurors. However, demographic data was 
collected as part of this study to gather more descriptive information about the 
sample. Future research should explore the impact of some of these demographic 
variables, as well as explore the opinions of mental health care providers compared 
to judges and mock jurors. It would also be valuable for future studies to replicate 
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this study and evaluate whether the diagnostic labels impact decision-makers, or if 
the results would be similar with just a description of symptoms.  
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Appendix A- Tables 
 
Table 1. Demographic Information 
Variable Mock Jurors 
 (N = 195) 
Judges 
 (N = 158) 
 
Age (SD) 37.2 (12.6) 60.1 (7.2) 
Gender (%) 
Female 
Male  
 
47.2% 
52.8% 
 
15.2% 
84.8% 
Race  
Black 
Asian or Pacific Islander 
White 
Hispanic 
Other  
 
5.1% 
8.7% 
83.6% 
7.2% 
2.7% 
 
2.5% 
0.6% 
95.6% 
3.8% 
0.6% 
Political Affiliation 
Democratic 
Republican 
 
41.5% 
21.5% 
 
35.4% 
39.9% 
Independent  
Other 
Religion 
Agnostic 
Atheist 
Catholic 
Christian-Protestant 
Other 
Setting 
Urban 
Suburban 
Rural 
16.4% 
20.6% 
 
22.6% 
20% 
14.9% 
29.2% 
13.2% 
 
28.7% 
48.7% 
22.6% 
 
 
7% 
17.8% 
 
8.2% 
4.4% 
28.5% 
40% 
18.3% 
 
38.6% 
23.4% 
37.3% 
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Table 2. Full Results- Judges’ Dichotomous Sentencing Decisions 
Conditions Cc2 p F 
Schizophrenia 
(N=36) 
Bipolar 
Disorder 
(N=34) 
3.18 0.10 0.21 
Schizophrenia 
(N=36) 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=27)  
0.81 0.53 0.11 
Schizophrenia 
(N=36) 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=29) 
0.54 0.50 -0.91 
Schizophrenia 
(N=36) 
Control (N=32) 8.60 <0.01 0.36 
Bipolar 
Disorder 
(N=34) 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=27) 
0.62 0.58 -0.10 
Bipolar 
Disorder 
(N=34) 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=29) 
5.37 0.04 -.02 
Bipolar 
Disorder 
(N=34) 
Control (N=32) 1.46 0.32 0.15 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=27) 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=29) 
2.31 0.17 -0.20 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=27) 
Control (N=32) 3.59 0.07 0.25 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=29) 
Control (N=32) 11.15 <.01 0.43 
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Table 3. Full Results- Mock Jurors’ Dichotomous Sentencing Decisions 
Conditions C2 p F 
Schizophrenia 
(N=42) 
Bipolar 
Disorder 
(N=38) 
3.09 0.09 0.09 
Schizophrenia 
(N=42) 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=40)  
5.15 0.03 0.25 
Schizophrenia 
(N=42) 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=39) 
3.64 0.04 0.21 
Schizophrenia 
(N=42) 
Control (N=36) 12.75 <0.01 0.40 
Bipolar 
Disorder 
(N=38) 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=40) 
0.24 0.65 0.06 
Bipolar 
Disorder 
(N=38) 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=39) 
0.02 0.89 .02 
Bipolar 
Disorder 
(N=38) 
Control (N=36) 3.46 0.10 0.22 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=40) 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=39) 
0.13 0.82 -0.04 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=40) 
Control (N=36) 1.97 0.18 0.16 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
(N=39) 
Control (N=36) 3.02 0.11 0.20 
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Table 4. Mitigating Circumstances Questionnaire- Judges & Jurors 
Item t p d 
The defendant had been sexually abused as a child 3.02 .003 0.318 
The defendant had been badly beaten by parents as a 
child 
3.71 <.001 
0.392 
The defendant had been verbally abused as a child .97 .34 0.102 
The defendant had parents who were alcoholics 2.25 .03 0.238 
The defendant had parents who had been 
psychiatrically hospitalized 
.43 .66 
0.046 
The defendant had early childhood behavior 
problems 
2.79 .005 
0.295 
The defendant was intoxicated when the crime took 
place 
5.49 <.001 
0.579 
The defendant was under the influence of illegal 
drugs when the crime took place 
4.89 <.001 
0.517 
The defendant had been under much stress from 
other offenders when the crime took place 
3.09 .002 
0.327 
The defendant had been sleep deprived when the 
crime took place 
2.67 .008 
0.282 
The defendant had been rejected by his fiancé when 
the crime took place 
2.74 .006 
0.289 
The defendant had not been taking anti-psychotic 
medication that was needed and prescribed when the 
crime took place 
3.58 <.001 
0.378 
The defendant was an alcoholic 4.71 <.001 0.497 
The defendant was dependent on or addicted to 
illegal drugs 
6.24 <.001 
0.659 
The defendant had been psychiatrically hospitalized 3.98 <.001 0.420 
The defendant had been knocked unconscious from 
blows to the head in the month prior to the crime 
2.17 .03 
0.230 
The defendant was schizophrenic 2.97 .003 0.314 
The defendant was depressed 1.69 .09 0.179 
The defendant was a veteran 4.59 <.001 0.485 
The defendant had no prior criminal record 6.37 <.001 0.672 
The defendant had a regular job 5.37 <.001 0.567 
The defendant had attended church regularly 3.57 <.001 0.376 
The defendant had not been in trouble when in jail -.18 .86 -0.019 
The defendant had been cooperative with law 
enforcement officers 
3.41 <.001 
0.360 
The defendant was a member of a gang and was a 
follower 
4.48 <.001 
0.473 
The defendant was a member of a gang and was a 
leader 
1.32 .18 
0.140 
The defendant was mentally retarded 4.28 <.001 0.452 
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Appendix B: Death Eligibility Questionnaire 
1. Are you religiously, morally, or otherwise against the imposition of the 
death penalty? 
2. If you were a juror in a criminal proceeding, would you automatically (in 
every case) vote against the death penalty, regardless of the facts and 
evidence of the case? 
3. If you were a juror in a criminal proceeding, would you automatically (in 
every case) vote to impose the death penalty in a murder case, regardless of 
the facts and evidence of the case? 
 
On a scale of 1-10, 1 being “extremely against” and 10 being “extremely in favor 
of,” how do you feel about the death penalty? 
 
1……..2….......3…….....4……..5………..6………..7…..…...8……..9…..10 
Extremely             Extremely 
Against         In Favor Of 
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Appendix C: Case Vignette Condition 1 (Schizophrenia) 
Imagine the following scenario as a capital case being heard in a state court:   
 The defendant broke into an office building at approximately 9:00 PM by 
breaking a glass door. After walking around the offices, he noticed two employees 
still working. The defendant shot and killed both employees. The guilt phase of the 
trial just finished and the defendant has been found guilty of breaking and 
entering, and murdering both employees.  
 During the sentencing phase of the trial, a licensed psychologist was called 
to the stand who had conducted a psychological evaluation of the defendant. He 
testified that in his clinical opinion, the defendant has Schizophrenia. The 
defendant experienced symptoms including delusions, hallucinations, and 
disorganized and nonsensical speech and behavior.  
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Appendix D: Case Vignette Condition 2 (Bipolar Disorder) 
Imagine the following scenario as a capital case being heard in a state court:   
 The defendant broke into an office building at approximately 9:00 PM by 
breaking a glass door. After walking around the offices, he noticed two employees 
still working. The defendant shot and killed both employees. The guilt phase of the 
trial just finished and the defendant has been found guilty of breaking and 
entering, and murdering both employees.  
 During the sentencing phase of the trial, a licensed psychologist was called 
to the stand who had conducted a psychological evaluation of the defendant. He 
testified that in his clinical opinion, the defendant has Bipolar I Disorder. The 
defendant experienced symptoms including distinct periods of abnormally and 
persistently elevated and irritable mood, increased energy, decreased need for 
sleep, racing thoughts, pressured speech, and excessive spending and otherwise 
risky behavior. 
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Appendix E: Case Vignette Condition 3 (Antisocial Personality Disorder) 
Imagine the following scenario as a capital case being heard in a state court:   
 The defendant broke into an office building at approximately 9:00 PM by 
breaking a glass door. After walking around the offices, he noticed two employees 
still working. The defendant shot and killed both employees. The guilt phase of the 
trial just finished and the defendant has been found guilty of breaking and 
entering, and murdering both employees.  
 During the sentencing phase of the trial, a licensed psychologist was called 
to the stand who had conducted a psychological evaluation of the defendant. He 
testified that in his clinical opinion, the defendant has Antisocial Personality 
Disorder. The defendant experienced symptoms including failure to conform to 
social norms with respect to lawful behaviors, deceitfulness and repeated lying, 
impulsivity and failure to plan ahead, irritability and aggressiveness, reckless 
disregard for safety of self or others, consistent irresponsibility, and a lack of 
remorse.  
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Appendix F: Case Vignette Condition 4 (Borderline Personality Disorder) 
Imagine the following scenario as a capital case being heard in a state court:   
 The defendant broke into an office building at approximately 9:00 PM by 
breaking a glass door. After walking around the offices, he noticed two employees 
still working. The defendant shot and killed both employees. The guilt phase of the 
trial just finished and the defendant has been found guilty of breaking and 
entering, and murdering both employees.  
 During the sentencing phase of the trial, a licensed psychologist was called 
to the stand who had conducted a psychological evaluation of the defendant. He 
testified that in his clinical opinion, the defendant has Borderline Personality 
Disorder. The defendant experienced symptoms including frantic efforts to avoid 
real or imagined abandonment, a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal 
relationships, persistently unstable self-image or sense of self, impulsivity that can 
be self-damaging, recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-
mutilating behavior, affective instability and intense mood reactivity/irritability, 
and difficulty controlling anger.  
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Appendix G: Case Vignette Condition 5 (Control- No mental illness) 
Imagine the following scenario as a capital case being heard in a state court:   
 The defendant broke into an office building at approximately 9:00 PM by 
breaking a glass door. After walking around the offices, he noticed two employees 
still working. The defendant shot and killed both employees. The guilt phase of the 
trial just finished and the defendant has been found guilty of breaking and 
entering, and murdering both employees.  
 During the sentencing phase of the trial, a licensed psychologist was called 
to the stand who had conducted a psychological evaluation of the defendant. He 
testified that in his clinical opinion, the defendant does not meet criteria for a 
mental illness.  
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Appendix H: Case Survey (Control) 
Please answer the following questions regarding how you would recommend 
sentencing the defendant and general questions about the case.   
 
1. Would you impose a sentence of the death penalty or life in prison for this 
defendant, given the information provided about the case? 
 
_____Life in prison 
 
_____Death penalty 
 
 
 
2. On a scale from 1-5, how confident are you in your sentencing decision? 
1---------------------2----------------------3---------------------4-----------------------5 
Extremely     Unconfident   Unsure  Confident      Extremely  
Unconfident              Confident 
      
 
3. On a scale from 1-5, how dangerous do you believe the defendant to be? 
 
1---------------------2--------------------3-----------------4---------------------5  
Not at all    A little bit  Somewhat        Quite a bit       Extremely  
Dangerous        Dangerous      Dangerous             Dangerous       Dangerous 
 
4. On a scale from 1-5, how in control of his actions do you believe the defendant 
to have been? 
 
1---------------------2-------------------3--------------------4---------------------5  
Not at all   A little bit   Somewhat          Quite a bit        Extremely  
in control     in control         in control           in control                  in control 
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Appendix I: Case Survey (Mental Illness Conditions) 
Please answer the following questions regarding how you would recommend 
sentencing the defendant and general questions about the case.   
 
1. Would you impose a sentence of the death penalty or life in prison for this 
defendant, given the information provided about the case and the defendant’s 
mental health status? 
 
_____Life in prison 
 
_____Death penalty 
 
 
2. On a scale from 1-5, how confident are you in your sentencing decision? 
1------------------------2------------------------3------------------------4--------------------5 
Extremely    Unconfident        Unsure        Confident        Extremely  
Unconfident               Confident 
     
 
3. On a scale from 1-5, how much did the mental health information provided 
about the defendant affect your sentencing decision? 
 
1----------------------2------------------------3------------------------4---------------------5 
Not at all    A little bit    Somewhat Quite a bit   Very much  
 
4. Do you find the mental health information provided about the defendant to be 
mitigating or aggravating? 
• “Mitigating” means that the information explains (but does not 
excuse) the crime and may lessen or reduce its severity. 
• “Aggravating” means that the information increases the severity of 
the crime.  
 
-5…….-4…......-3……...-2……..-1……..0…….1….…..2………3……4…..5 
Aggravating     Neither        Mitigating 
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5. On a scale from 1-5, how dangerous do you believe the defendant to be? 
 
1---------------------2------------------------3---------------------4------------------------5 
Not at all    A little bit    Somewhat        Quite a bit       Extremely  
Dangerous         Dangerous                Dangerous              Dangerous       Dangerous 
 
6. On a scale from 1-5, how in control of his actions do you believe the defendant 
to have been? 
 
1---------------------2------------------------3--------------------4---------------------5  
Not at all    A little bit    Somewhat      Quite a bit        Extremely  
in control     in control                 in control     in control            in control 
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Appendix J: Case Vignette Quiz 
1. The defendant was convicted of committing which of the following crimes? 
 A. Armed Robbery 
 B. Manslaughter 
 C. Assault with a Deadly Weapon 
 D. Murder 
 
2. How many people were killed? 
 A. 1 
 B. 2 
 C. 3 
 D. 4  
 
3. With which disorder was the defendant diagnosed? 
(Choices will change depending on condition) 
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Appendix K 
See Barnett, Brodksy, & Davis (2004) for full measure. 
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Appendix L: Judge Demographic Questionnaire 
1. What is your age: _______ 
2. What gender do you identify with: _______ 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Other 
3. What is your ethnicity: ______ 
a. Hispanic/Latino 
b. Non Hispanic/Latino 
4. What is your race: ______ 
a. American Indian or Alaskan Native 
b. Asian 
c. Black or African American 
d. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
e. White 
f. Other _____________ 
5. What is your political affiliation: _________ 
a. American Independent 
b. Democratic 
c. Green 
d. Libertarian 
e. Peace and Freedom 
f. Republican 
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g. Other _______________ 
6. What is your religion: _____________ 
a. Agnostic 
b. Athiest 
c. Buddhist 
d. Catholic 
e. Christian – Protestant 
f. Hindu 
g. Jewish 
h. Muslim 
i. Other -______________ 
7. What state do you preside in: ____________ 
8. What setting do you preside in:___________ 
a. Rural 
b. Suburban 
c. Urban 
9. How long have you been a judge? _________years 
10. Have you ever presided over a death penalty case? (Y/N) 
11. If yes to the previous question, approximately how many death penalty 
cases have you presided over? __________ 
12. What type of court do you preside over? 
a. Appellate 
b. Trial 
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c. Other 
13. Do you consider yourself to be knowledgeable about mental illness?  
a. Yes 
b. Somewhat  
c. A little bit 
d. Not at all 
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Appendix M: Mock Juror Demographic Questionnaire 
1. What is your age: _______ 
2. What gender do you identify with: _______ 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Other 
3. What is your ethnicity: ______ 
a. Hispanic/Latino 
b. Non Hispanic/Latino 
4. What is your race: ______ 
a. American Indian or Alaskan Native 
b. Asian 
c. Black or African American 
d. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
e. White 
f. Other ______________ 
5. What is the highest level of education you have obtained: _______ 
a. Less than high school 
b. High school completion/GED 
c. Some college 
d. Associate’s degree 
e. Bachelor’s degree 
f. Master’s degree 
	 56	
g. Professional degree 
h. Doctorate degree 
6. What is your political affiliation: _________ 
a. American Independent 
b. Democratic 
c. Green 
d. Libertarian 
e. Peace and Freedom 
f. Republican 
g. Other _______________ 
7. What is your religion: _____________ 
a. Agnostic 
b. Athiest 
c. Buddhist 
d. Catholic 
e. Christian – Protestant 
f. Hindu 
g. Jewish 
h. Muslim 
i. Other -______________ 
8. What state do you reside in: ____________ 
9. What setting do you reside in:___________ 
a. Rural 
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b. Suburban 
c. Urban 
10. Have you ever been the victim of a violent crime or assault? (Y/N) 
11. Has anyone close to you ever been the victim of a violent crime or assault? 
(Y/N) 
12. Has anyone close to you ever been charged with capital murder? (Y/N) 
13. Have you ever worked in a mental health setting? (Y/N) 
14. Do you consider yourself to be knowledgeable about mental illness?  
a. Yes 
b. Somewhat  
c. A little bit 
d. Not at all  
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